The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States by Shrestha, Laura B.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL32701
The Changing Demographic Profile 
 of the United States
Updated May 5, 2006
Laura B. Shrestha
Specialist in Demography
Domestic Social Policy Division
The Changing Demographic Profile
 of the United States
Summary
The United States, the third most populous country globally, accounts for about
4.6% of the world’s population.  Within the next few years, the U.S. population —
currently estimated at 299 million persons — is expected to reach twice its 1950 level
of 152 million.  More than just being double in size, the population has become
qualitatively different from what it was in 1950.  As noted by the Population
Reference Bureau, “The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse.”  The
objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have
already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape
the nation in the decades to come (through 2050).
The United States Is Getting Bigger.  This report considers population change
and the underlying factors that contribute to population growth in the United States.
These include increasing survival due to declining mortality rates (especially for the
three most prevalent causes of death), fertility levels that are hovering around the
generational “replacement” level, and trends in net international migration wherein
more migrants move into the United States than Americans who leave.
The United States Is Getting Older.  Aside from the total size, one of the most
important demographic characteristics of a population for public policy is its age and
sex structure.  This report illustrates how the United States has been in the midst of
a profound demographic change: the rapid aging of its population, as reflected by an
increasing proportion of persons aged 65 and older, and an increasing median age in
the population.  
The United States Is Becoming More Racially and Ethnically Diverse, reflecting
the major influence that immigration has had on both the size and the age structure
of the U.S. population.  This section considers the changing profile of the five major
racial groups in the United States.  In addition, trends in the changing ethnic
composition of the Hispanic or Latino Origin population are discussed.
Although this report will not specifically discuss policy options to address the
changing demographic profile, it is important to recognize that the inexorable
demographic momentum will have important implications for the economic and
social forces that will shape future societal well-being.  There is ample reason to
believe that the United States will be able to cope with the current and projected
demographic changes if policymakers accelerate efforts to address and adapt to the
changing population profile as it relates to a number of essential domains, such as
work, retirement, and pensions, private wealth and income security, and the health
and well-being of the aging population.  These topics are discussed briefly in the final
section of this report.  This report will be updated as needed.
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1 U.S. Census Bureau, POPclock, at [http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html],
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(calculated as one birth every 8 seconds; one death every 13 seconds; and one international
(net) migrant every 31 seconds).
2 CRS calculations using data extracted from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base
(IDB), at [http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html].
3 P. Scommegna, U.S. growing bigger, older, and more diverse.  Population Reference
Bureau, Apr. 2004, at [http://www.prb.org/].
4 Through year 2050 is considered in this report. 
5 National Research Council, 2001, Preparing for an Aging World: The Case for Cross-
National Research, Panel on a Research Agenda and New Data for an Aging World,
Committee on Population and Committee on National Statistics, Division of Behavioral and
Social Sciences and Education, Wash., DC: National Academy Press. (Hereafter cited as
National Research Council, Preparing for an Aging World, 2001).
The Changing Demographic Profile
 of the United States
The United States, the third-largest population globally, accounts for about 4.6%
of the world’s population.  The U.S. population — currently estimated at 298.6
million persons1 — is projected to reach twice its 1950 level of 152 million in year
2008.2  More than just being double in size, the U.S. population has become
qualitatively different from what it was in 1950.  As noted by the Population
Reference Bureau, “The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse.”3  The
objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have
already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape
the nation in the decades to come.4
While this report will not discuss policy options, it is important to recognize that
the inexorable demographic momentum will produce an increasingly older
population in the United States  There is ample reason to believe that the United
States will be able to cope with the current and projected changes if policymakers
address and adapt to the changing demographic profile as it relates to a number of
essential domains such as work, retirement, and pensions, private wealth and income
security, transfer systems, and the health and well-being of the aging population.5
These topics are discussed briefly in the final section of this report.
Population Size and Growth — The United States Is Getting
Bigger
The U.S. population has experienced remarkable growth over the past half-
century.  From a base of about 152 million Americans in 1950, an additional 131
CRS-2
6 CRS calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: the 2004
Revision, Highlights, United Nations: New York, 2005: ST/ESA/P/WP.193, available at
[http://www.un.org/esa/pop]. (Hereafter cited as United Nations, World Population
Prospects: the 2004 Revision).
7 Ibid.  See also U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports WP/02, Global
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Figure 1.  U.S. Population, by Sex, 1950-2050, in Millions
million persons were added to the population between 1950 and 2000 (the year of the
most recent census), with the number of additional women slightly outnumbering
additional men (see Figure 1).  This increase (of about 85%) in the size of the U.S.
population was remarkable compared with other industrialized countries.  Germany
and Italy, for instance, grew by only 20% and 22% respectively during the same
period.6  And, a number of countries, most notably in Eastern Europe, have recently
experienced absolute reductions in the size of their populations.
Sources: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations based on: (1) for 1950-1990 estimates,
F. Hobbs & N. Stoops, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century, Census Bureau: CENSR-4, issued
Nov. 2002, and (2) for 2000-2050, U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin.
Census Bureau, at [http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/]. 
Despite the growth of the U.S. population over this period, the United States’
share of the world’s population has been declining as less developed, higher fertility
countries have grown more rapidly.  Bangladesh and Nigeria, for instance, now rank
#8 and #9 in total population size, surpassing more developed countries — such as
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy — that are no longer among the
world’s 10 most populous countries.7
The Census Bureau projects that the U.S. population will continue  to grow, to
420 million persons by year 2050, albeit at a slower pace than the growth recorded
over the past half-century.  Note, however, that population projections, which rely
upon assumptions about the future courses of mortality, fertility, and immigration are
uncertain.  More pessimistic growth projections are offered by the United Nations
CRS-3
8 It is beyond the scope of this report to reconcile these differences. All projections are
medium-variant, or what the agencies consider to be the most likely scenario.  See (1)
United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision; and (2) 2006 Annual
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance and
Disability Insurance Funds.  Wash., DC: May 1, 2006, available at [http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TF06/tr06.pdf].
9 Population growth rate: the number of persons added to (or subtracted from) a population
in a year due to natural increase (births minus deaths) and net immigration per 1,000 persons
in the population.  Alternatively, the measure can be expressed as a percentage of the

































Figure 2. Population Growth, Birth, Death, and Net Immigration
Rates: United States, 1950-2050
and the Social Security Administration, which estimate that the U.S. population will
be 395 million or 390 million respectively in the same year.8
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) compilation based on historical and projected figures
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).
Notes: (1) Crude birth rate (CBR): the number of live births per 1,000 total population.  Estimates for
1950-58 were adjusted by NCHS to correct for under-registration of births.  (2) Crude death rate
(CDR): the number of deaths per 1,000 total population. (3) Net immigration rate: number of
immigrants less number of emigrants per 1,000 total population.
Average annual growth rates9 for each 10-year intercensal  period between 1950
and 2000 were positive, but have generally been declining over time (see Figure 2
and Table 7).  Expressed as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the
period, the average population growth rate in the 1950s, for example, was 1.7% per
annum while it was only 0.9% per year during the 1980s.  The Census Bureau
CRS-4
10 The Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is the primary measure of fertility used in this section
because of its value in indicating directly the contribution of fertility to the population
growth rate.  However, because the age and sex composition of a population has a strong
influence on the level of the CBR, additional measures to understand the underlying fertility
trends are also used.
11 Gregory Spencer, Preface, The Direction of Fertility in the United States. Conference
proceedings for a conference hosted by the Council of Professional Associations on Federal
Statistics, Alexandria, VA, Oct. 2-3, 2001.
12 National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR), Births: Final Data for 2003, DHHS/CDC/
NCHS, vol. 54, no. 2, Sep. 8, 2005 (hereafter cited as NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2003).
Note that preliminary data for 2004 have been released and are available in NVSR, Births:
Preliminary Data for 2004, vol. 54, no. 8, Dec. 29, 2005.  Preliminary data for 2004 suggest
that the birth rate fell to 14.0 in 2004.   
13  NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2003.
assumes that the growth rate will remain positive through year 2050 but will fall from
its current level of about 0.9% per annum to 0.7%.
Trends in the size and growth of the U.S. population reflect the interactions of
three underlying determinants:
! The role of human reproduction and the fertility behavior of
American couples;
! Trends in disease risk and subsequent mortality, and,
! The net effect of international immigration to and from the United
States.
Figure 2 and Appendix Table A (at end of this report), in addition to
highlighting the estimated and projected trends in population growth for the period
1950-2050, also highlight trends and projections for these three underlying
components of population change.  Characteristics of U.S. fertility, mortality, and
immigration are discussed in the following sections.
Fertility.10  Average fertility in the United States reached a post-World War II
maximum during the peak of the “baby boom” in the late 1950s.  The highest
observed number of annual births (4.3 million) and birth rates (25.3 births per 1,000
population) since 1950 were recorded in 1957.  Steep declines were observed in the
1960s and early 1970s, a broad trend that was also observed in Europe, Canada,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.  U.S. birth rates since the early 1970s have
remained remarkably constant,11 mostly fluctuating in the mid-teens, and reached an
all-time low of 13.9 live births per 1,000 population in 2002.  A slight increase to
14.1 live births per 1,000 population was observed in 2003, the most recent year for
which final data are available12.
Characteristics of American Fertility.  Highlights of American fertility
behavior in 2003 include the following:13
! There were approximately  4.1 million live births, an increase of 2%
from 2002.
CRS-5
14 The replacement level of fertility measures the level of fertility and mortality in a
population at which women will replace themselves in a generation.  It corresponds to a total
fertility rate, or completed family size, of about 2.10 births per woman.  
15 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision.
! The crude birth rate (CBR) increased 1% between 2002 and 2003,
to 14.1 live births per 1,000 total population.  The CBR in year
2002, at 13.9/1,000 population, had been the lowest rate ever
recorded for the United States.
! The general fertility rate (GFR), which relates births to the number
of women in their childbearing ages, was 66.1 live births per 1,000
women aged 15-44 years, also an increase from year 2002.
! Fertility rates, as measured by the GFR, increased for non-Hispanic
white and Hispanic women by 2% and 3%, respectively, but
decreased slightly for non-Hispanic black women.  Fertility also
increased for Asian and Pacific Islander women but was essentially
unchanged for American Indian women.
! Fertility is slighting under the “replacement level” in 2003, for the
32nd consecutive year.14  In 2003, there were, on average, 2.042
births per U.S. woman, with total fertility rates below the
replacement level for most groups of women.  However, rates for
American women of Mexican origin (2.958) and “other” Hispanics
(2.733) were above replacement.  Many European and Asian
countries or regions have levels of fertility that are considerably
lower than in the United States  For instance, Macao SAR (0.84),
Hong Kong (0.94), Ukraine (1.12), Czech Republic (1.17), and
Slovakia (1.20) are all well below replacement.15
! The mean age of all first-time mothers in the United States was 25.2
years in 2003, slightly higher than in 2002.  This all-time high for
American women attests to the continuing tendency of women to
postpone childbearing.  Since 1970, the mean age at first birth has
risen 3.8 years (from 21.4 years).  Mean age at first birth varies
considerably by race and Hispanic origin.  Women of Asian and
Pacific Islander descent had the highest age at first birth (28.3 years),
whereas American Indian women had the lowest (21.8 years).
! Childbearing by unmarried women rose steeply in 2003.  The
number of births to unmarried women climbed 4% to 1,415,995, the
highest number recorded in the more than six decades for which
national data are available.  The proportion of all births to unmarried
women increased to 34.6%; this measure has risen steadily since the
late 1990s.
! U.S. fertility trends differ by the age of the mother (Table 1).  In
general, birth rates for  “younger” women declined while those of
older women increased.
CRS-6
16 J. Long, 2001, Introductory Remarks,  The Direction of Fertility in the United States.
Conference proceedings for a conference hosted by the Council of Professional Associations
on Federal Statistics, Alexandria, VA, Oct. 2-3, 2001.
17 S. P. Morgan,  Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First Century Demographic Crisis? Demography
vol. 40,  no. 4, 2003, pp. 589-603.
18 For instance, Rindfuss stressed the importance of affordable, quality child care in
weakening the incompatibility of work and childbearing and child-rearing.  Bianchi stressed
gender and technological changes that affected the division of household labor.  See (1) R.R.
Rindfuss, “The Young Adult Years: Diversity, Structural Change, and Fertility,”
Demography, vol. 28, pp. 493-512, 1991.  (2) S.M. Bianchi, “Maternal Employment and
(continued...)






Trend Between 2002 and 2003
10-14 years 0.6 Declined. A one-third decline since 2000.
15-19 years 41.6
Declined. Fell 3% from previous year, a record
low for the United States  Rate has plummeted
by one-third since peak in 1991 (61.8)
20-24 years 102.6
Declined, the lowest rate on record for age
group in the United States
25-29 years 115.6 Increased by 2%.
30-34 years 95.1
Increased.  Highest rate recorded since the
mid-1960s.
35-39 years 43.8
Increased.  Highest rate recorded since the
mid-1960s.
40-44 years 8.7
Increased.  Highest rate recorded since 1969;
rate for age group is up 58% since 1990.
45-49 years 0.5 Unchanged.
Source: NSVR, Births: Final Data for 2003, vol. 54, no. 2, Sep. 8, 2005.
Beyond the current year estimates presented above, the Census Bureau uses
demographic projection techniques to predict future trends in American fertility.
They project that birth rates will remain low through 2050, in the narrow range of
13.9-14.3 births per 1,000 persons annually.  Note, however, that future trends in
fertility are notoriously difficult to predict and specialists continually question the
underlying assumptions of the models.  Some experts are concerned that stability in
U.S. fertility may not continue, particularly in light of the declines that have occurred
in other developed countries.16  Others argue that very low fertility is not inevitable
and that fertility may return to higher levels.  For instance, Morgan,17 in his address
as president to the membership of the Population Association of America, argued that
there are both persistent rationales for having children and institutional adjustments18
CRS-7
18 (...continued)
Time with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising Continuity?” Demography, vol. 37, pp.
401-14, 2000.
19 The crude death rate (CDR) is the primary measure of mortality used in this section to
show the contribution of mortality to the population growth rate. 
20 See National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR), Deaths: Final Data for 2003,
DHHS/CDC/NCHS, vol. 54, no. 13, April 19, 2006.  (Hereafter cited as NVSR, Deaths:
Final Data for 2003).  Note that preliminary data on deaths in 2004 suggests that the CDR
has fallen further to 8.2 deaths per 1,000 population. See A.M. Minino, M. Heron, B.L.
Smith, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2004, at [http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/products].
21  Note that age-adjusted rates have little meaning in themselves; they are constructs that
show what the level of mortality would be if no changes occurred in the age composition of
the population from year to year.
22 The age-adjusted rates are based on the year 2000 standard population.   By definition,
crude and age-adjusted death rates converge in this year.  
can make the widespread intentions for having two children attainable, even in
increasingly individualistic and egalitarian societies.
Mortality.  As is evident from Figures 2 and 3, crude death rates (CDR) in the
United States have been remarkably constant since 1950, fluctuating within the
narrow range of 8.5 to 9.7 deaths per 1,000 persons.19  The record low of 8.4 was
attained in the most recent year for which final data are available, 2003.20
In general, crude death rates are referred to as crude because they are influenced
by two underlying characteristics of a population, making it difficult to interpret
trends in the CDR without disentangling trends in these two underlying components:
! The population’s age structure.  An older population generally has
higher crude death rates because a higher proportion of persons are
in the older age groups where death rates are higher.
! Mortality risk, or the likelihood of death at a particular age.  The risk
of mortality reflects the health and disease profile of the underlying
population, public health and sanitation, the availability of  and
access to health care, the education of the population, and other
factors.
Age-adjusted death rates are better indicators (than crude rates) to measure
mortality risk across time or across populations.21  If age-adjusted rates are
considered for the United States over time,22 a striking pattern of the mortality risk
emerges (see Figure 3): age-adjusted death rates have exhibited a dramatic decline
since 1950 (rather than being remarkably constant, as suggested by the crude death
rates).   Use of the age-adjusted rates has allowed a much more refined evaluation of
trends in American mortality over time.  Specifically, they show that, despite the fact
that the U.S. population has been aging over the past half-century, the risk of
mortality has actually been falling.
CRS-8
23 See National Vital Statistics Reports, Deaths: Final Data for 2003, DHHS/CDC/NCHS,
vol. 54, no. 13, April 19, 2006.
24 Life expectancy at birth represents the average number of years that a group of infants
would live if they were to experience the current observed age-specific death rates
throughout their lives.  See CRS Report RL32792, Life Expectancy in the United States, by
Laura B. Shrestha.
25 CRS compilation from data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: the 2004
(continued...)
Source:  CRS computations using data from the vital statistics system, NCHS.
Notes:  CDRs are on an annual basis per 1,000 population; age-adjusted rates per 1,000 U.S. standard
population (year 2000).
Characteristics of American Mortality.  Highlights of trends in American
mortality in 2003 include the following:23
! More than 2.4 million resident deaths were registered in the United
States in 2003, about 4,900 more than in 2002.
! The crude death rate was about 8.4 deaths per 1,000 total population,
a record low, and about 0.6 percent lower than the 2002 rate.
! Life expectancy at birth24 was 77.5 years, a record high that
surpassed the previous highest value, which was recorded in 2002.
Record high life expectancy was attained by the total population, as
well as by each of the black and white populations.  Both males and
females in each of the two major race groups attained record high
levels.  U.S. life expectancy continues to fall short of that attained by
a number of other countries, including Japan (81.9 years), Iceland





































26 Annual cancer deaths declined for the first time in more than 70 years in 2003. Experts
attribute the achievement to declines in smoking and better tumor detection and treatment.
While annual drops of about 1 percent in the cancer death rate (number of deaths from
cancer per 100,000 people) have been observed over the past decade, the actual number of
cancer deaths still rose each year because the growth in total population outpaced the falling
death rates.  See Associated Press, “Cancer Deaths Fall for First Time in 20 Years,” Mar.
21, 2006.
! The 10 leading causes of death were (1) heart disease, (2) malignant
neoplasms (cancer),26 (3) cerebrovascular diseases (stroke), (4)
chronic lower respiratory diseases, (5) accidents (unintentional
injuries), (6) diabetes mellitus, (7) influenza and pneumonia, (8)
Alzheimer’s disease, (9) nephritis (kidney disease), and (10)
septicemia.  Age-adjusted death rates continued to decrease for the
three leading causes.  The age-adjusted death rate for influenza and
pneumonia (7th leading cause) also decreased (by 2.7%) despite an
influenza outbreak in 2003.  Increasing trends for Alzheimer’s
disease continued.
! Differences in mortality between men and women continued to
narrow.  In 2003, the age-adjusted death rate for men was 41%
greater than that for women (down from 42% greater in 2002).  Life
expectancy at birth for females was 80.1 years, while it was 74.8
years for men (both increases from the previous year).  The sex gap
in life expectancy, 5.3 years, has been falling from its late 1970s
peak of 7.8 years.
! Differences in mortality between the black and white populations
persisted even though there was a trend toward convergence.  The
age-adjusted death rate was 1.3 times greater, the infant mortality
rate 2.4 times greater, and maternal mortality rate 3.5 times greater
for the black population than for the white population.  Life
expectancy for the white population exceeded that for the black
population by 5.3 years.
! The infant mortality rate was 6.85 infant deaths per 1,000 live births,
a small reduction from 2002.  Note that the rate had increased in
2002, the first increase in over four decades.
As with the data for fertility, demographers use demographic projection
techniques to predict the future trends in American mortality.  The Census Bureau
projects that (crude) death rates will remain low through 2050 in the narrow range
of 8.6 to 9.9 deaths per 1,000 persons in the population.  Its figures gradually
increase, reflecting the Census Bureau’s assumption that the aging of the population
will not be fully offset by continued reductions in the risk of dying.
As with other demographic variables, however, future mortality and survival are
difficult to predict and specialists disagree on not only the level but also the direction
of future trends.  Three recent articles were published that suggest that current
models may be too pessimistic in their assumptions about mortality and survival
CRS-10
27 R. Lee, Report for the Roundtable Discussion of the Mortality Assumption for the Social
Security Trustees, note dated Sept. 11, 2002. 
28 K. White, Longevity advances in high income countries, 1955-96. Population and
Development Review, vol. 28, no. 1, Mar. 2002,  pp. 59-76.
29 J. Oeppen and J. Vaupel, Broken limits to life expectancy, Science, vol. 296,  May 10,
2002,  pp. 1029-1030. 
30 F. Pampel, Cigarette Use and the Narrowing Sex Differential in Mortality. Population and
Development Review, vol. 28, no.1, Mar. 2002,  pp. 77-104. 
31 R. S. Boyd, Life is Too Short, and it Might be Getting Shorter, Free Press, Washington
Staff, Nov. 4, 2004, referring to comments made by J. Olshanky. 
32 These figures refer to legal immigrants, or citizens of other countries who have been
granted visas that allow them to live and work permanently in the United States  It includes
(1) relatives of U.S. residents; (2) foreigners who were admitted for economic or
employment reasons; (3) refugees and asylees; and (4) persons in the “diversity” category,
which was created to introduce more variety into the stream of immigrants. It does not
include nonimmigrants (visitors, short-term workers, or students) or illegal immigrants.
probabilities, i.e., Americans may live longer than currently projected.27  Two of
these studies showed that there has been a tendency for international life expectancy
to rise linearly by more than two years per decade over the past 40 years28 or the last
160 years,29 suggesting that future mortality decline may be more rapid than current
models suggest.  Also, a useful analysis of the contribution of smoking behavior to
mortality trends30 suggests that slow female gains in the United States may be
temporary, and that the pace of mortality gains may pick up fairly soon.  On the other
hand, another expert recently argued that the trend toward longer lives will probably
level off in coming years as a result of the rising tide of obesity and the re-emergence
of deadly infectious diseases.31
Net Immigration.  Immigration has been an important component of
population growth in the United States. The net immigration rate (Figure 2) has been
and is projected to be positive (with in-migration exceeding out-migration) for the
full century (1950 to 2050).  It fluctuated in the low range of 1.5 to 2.4 net migrants
per 1,000 resident population between 1950 and 1979.  An increasing trend has been
noted since 1980, and the annual rates in the 1990s were generally all in the range of
3.0 to 3.9.  The U.S. Bureau of the Census projects that net migration will continue
to be an important component of population growth in the United States through
2050 albeit at a slightly reduced rate than currently observed.
What have been the relative roles of gross immigration and gross emigration to
recent trends? In general, the balance of gross immigration (of persons moving
permanently to the United States) has exceeded gross emigration (of persons leaving)
over the past century.  A notable exception was observed during the Great
Depression, when the number of  out-migrants exceeded new immigrants (see Table
2).  Reflecting fluctuations in economic conditions (in the United States and abroad)
and U.S. immigration policies, the volume of immigrant32 flow  to the United States
has fluctuated over time.  Starting in 1915, immigration to the United States was
curtailed because of World War I, the introduction of numerical limits (or “quotas”),
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34  US Dept. of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2004.  GPO, Wash., DC, Jan.
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the economic depression of the 1930s, and World War II.33  Starting in the 1950s, the
volume of immigration flows to the United States has been steadily increasing.  The
average annual inflow was about 252,000 in the 1950s, about 332,000 in the 1960s,
449,000 in the 1970s, and jumped to 734,000 in the 1980s.  More than 9 million
foreigners were admitted as legal immigrants to the United States between 1991 and
2000, an  average of 900,000 a year.  In the most recent years, the number of legal
immigrants surpassed 1 million persons in both 2001 and 2002, but fell to 706,000
persons in 2003 and 946,000 persons in 2004.34
















2001-2004 3,780 1,202 2,578 0.31
1991-2000 9,095 2,338 6,757 0.26
1981-1990 7,338 1,600 5,738 0.22
1971-1980 4,493 1,176 3,317 0.26
1961-1970 3,322 900 2,422 0.27
1951-1960 2,515 425 2,090 0.17
1941-1950 1,035 281 754 0.27
1931-1940 528 649 -121 1.23
Sources:  For immigration, all years: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics, 2004,  GPO, Washington, DC, January 2006.  For emigration, years
1931-90: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000, GPO, Washington, DC, 2002.  For 1991-
2000: U.S. Census Bureau, Net International Migration and its Sub-Components for the
Vintage 2000 Post-censal National Estimates: 1990 to 2000, Internet release date Feb. 8,
2002.  For 2001-2004, Population Reference Bureau, Estimates and Projections of
Emigration from the United States, available at [http://www.prb.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/PRB/Journalists/FAQ/Questions/U_S__Emigration.htm].  For net
immigration and ratio: CRS computations based on sources cited.
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States, available at [http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Journalists/FAQ/
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37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004.
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There are few detailed and timely estimates of emigration of persons who leave
the United States to permanently take up residence elsewhere (whether native-born
or foreign-born Americans).  Partly because of inherent methodological difficulties,
the collection of emigration statistics was discontinued in 1957 and no direct measure
has been available since then.35  Using indirect demographic techniques, the Census
Bureau estimated that the number of emigrants leaving the United States has been
increasing  over the past decades — reaching about 234,000 persons annually during
the 1990s (compared to 910,000 annual immigrants during the same time period).
The Population Reference Bureau assumes roughly 300,000 annual emigrants for
years 2000-2005.36
Characteristics of Net Immigration.  Highlights of American immigration
in FY2004 include the following:37
! Current U.S. policy on permanent immigration is based on four
principles: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants
with special skills, the protection of refugees, and the diversity of
admissions by country of origin.38
! The number of persons granted lawful permanent residence in the
United States increased by more than 200,000 persons between 2003
and 2004, from 706,000 to 946,000.   
! The leading regions of origin of legal immigrants were North
America and Asia.  These regions accounted for 36% and 35%,
respectively, of all legal immigrants in 2004.
! The leading source countries (of birth) for legal immigrants in 2004
were Mexico (175,000 persons or 18.5%), followed by India (7.4%),
the Philippines (6.1%), China (5.4%), Vietnam (3.3%), and
Dominican Republic (3.2%).
! The primary destination states in 2004, as in every year since 1971,
were California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois.
Sixty-five percent of all (legal) persons immigrating to the United
States in 2004 lived in these six states.  
! Data on immigrant’s intended metropolitan area are not available for
FY2004.  However, 10 metropolitan areas were the intended
residence of 41% of all legal immigrants in 2003.  The leading
destinations were New York, NY; Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA;
Chicago, IL; and the Washington, DC-MD-VA metro area.
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40 CRS Report RL33351, ibid.
41 P. Martin and E. Midgley, Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America, Population
Reference Bureau: Population Bulletin, vol. 58, no. 2, June 2003. 
42 Aging (of a population) is a process in which the proportions of adults and elderly
increase, while the proportions of younger persons decrease, resulting in a rise in the median
age of the population.   
! The Census Bureau estimates that approximately 300,000 persons
emigrated annually in the period 2000-2004, an increase from the
late 1990s. 
! Unauthorized foreigners, also referred to as illegal aliens, deportable
aliens, or undocumented workers, are persons in the United States
in violation of U.S. immigration laws.   It is estimated that there are
more than 11 million unauthorized foreigners currently living in the
United States, and the resident unauthorized alien population is
estimated to increase by 500,000 people per year.39  United States
Border Patrol apprehensions increased steadily through the late
1990s, reaching a peak of 1.68 million in 2000.  From 2000 to 2003,
apprehension levels declined steadily, reaching a low of 931,557 in
2003.40  Each apprehension, even of the same person, is counted
separately.41
The Changing Age Profile — The United States Is Getting
Older
Aside from its total size, one of the most important demographic characteristics
of a population for public policy is its age and sex structure.  In general, a “young”
population structure is seen in countries experiencing high fertility and rapid
population growth, and the relevant policy considerations are whether there are
sufficient schools and, later, enough jobs and housing  to accommodate them.  On the
other hand, critical policy challenges in countries with “old” population structures are
to develop retirement and medical systems to serve the older population, often with
simultaneous reductions in the number of working-age persons to support them.
The population of the United States had been relatively “young” in the first half
of the 20th century, a consequence of a history of three demographic trends acting in
concert — relatively high fertility, declining infant and childhood mortality, and high
rates of net immigration to the United States by young workers and families.  Since
1950, the United States has been in the midst of a profound demographic change:
rapid population aging,42 a phenomenon that is replacing the earlier “young” age-sex
structure with that of an older population.
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(continued...)
Table 3. U.S. Population, by Age Group: 1950-2050
Age/year 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
Number (in thousands, rounded)
Total 152,271 215,972 282,339 349,666 420,081
0-19 51,672 75,646 80,560 92,038 109,158
20-64 88,202 117,630 166,718 194,105 224,217
65-65+ 12,397 22,696 35,061 63,524 86,706
Percent in Age Group (rounded)
0-19 33.9 35.0 28.5 26.3 26.0
20-64 57.9 54.5 59.0 55.5 53.4
65-65+ 8.1 10.5 12.4 18.2 20.6
Source: CRS computations based on data in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database,
at [http://www.census.gov/ipb].
Figure 4 graphically displays three population pyramids, which show the
proportion of persons in each five-year age and sex group in the U.S. population, at
three points in time — in census years 1950 and 2000, and projected to year 2050.
In 1950, the U.S. population, which numbered 152 million persons, was
relatively young and its population pyramid resembled a Christmas tree.  The widest
portion, representing the most populous age group, was at the base — where 16.4
million new births and children under age 5 accounted for 10.8% of the total U.S.
population.  Bars representing persons at older ages gradually narrow as deaths occur.
The median age was 30.2 years43 and births outnumbered deaths by a margin of 2.5
to 1.0.44  Three characteristics of the 1950 pyramid are especially worth noting: 
! The only significant departure from a pyramidal shape is notches
representing persons aged 10-24 years.  These persons were born
primarily during the economic depression of the 1930’s when birth
rates were comparatively low. 
! Early “baby boom” births are evident in the youngest age group.45
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with larger family sizes (more women had three or more children).  See C.L. Himes, Elderly
Americans, Population Bulletin, Wash. DC: Population Reference Bureau, Dec. 2001.
46 Population Reference Bureau, Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth: Three
Patterns of Population Change, at [http://www.prb.org].
! The number of persons aged 65 and older in the population was still
relatively low — 12.4 million persons, representing 8.1% of the U.S.
population. The population pyramid in year 2000, the most recent
year in which the U.S. population was enumerated by the decennial
census, is typical of a population experiencing slow growth.
Reflecting lower fertility, fewer people entered the lowest bars of the
pyramid, and as life expectancy has increased, a greater percentage
of persons have survived until old age.  As a result, the population
has been aging.  By 2000, the median age of the population had risen
to 35.3 years while infants and children under the age of five
accounted for only 6.8% of the population.  Important characteristics
of the U.S. population in year 2000 include:
! The U.S. population grew by roughly 85% between 1950 and 2000
 — from 152 million to 282 million persons.  The pyramid, which
is significantly larger in all age groups, reflects this fact.
! The bulge of the baby-boom generation, those born between 1946-
1964, can be seen in the pyramid for ages 35-54 years in 2000.  After
1964, birth rates moved downward until the late 1970s.  As the last
members of the baby boom approached their childbearing years
during the 1980s, the number of births rose again, peaking in 1990.
These children, the youngest generation, are represented by the
slightly widening base of the pyramid.  Even though the number of
births per woman is near an all time low, the population continues
to grow in part because of the children and grandchildren of the huge
baby-boom generation.46
! The number of persons aged 65 and older had been steadily
increasing and reached 35.1 million persons, representing 12.4% of
the U.S. population.
! The fact that female survival chances exceed those of men,
especially at the older ages, becomes noticeably more evident in the
2000 pyramid.  About 4.3% of the total female population was aged
80 and above in 2000 compared to only 2.2% of men.  
By year 2050, projections of the U.S. population suggest that the population
“pyramid” will no longer resemble a Christmas tree; rather, it will be increasingly
rectangular.  
! In this population of 420.1 million persons, the most striking feature
is the projected number of people who will be aged 65 and older —
86.7 million, just over one in every five persons in the total U.S.
population.  To put these figures into perspective, the “oldest” state
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48 See CRS Report RL32981, Age Dependency Ratios and Social Security Solvency, by
Laura B. Shrestha.
in the year 2000 census was Florida with 17.6% of the state’s
population in the age category 65 years and older.47 
! By year 2050, the percent elderly in the national population will
surpass the figures observed in the “oldest” states today.The oldest-
old, those aged 80 and above and including the youngest of the baby
boomers, will be the most populous age group — 33.7 million
persons or 8.0% of the entire U.S. population.  The oldest-old
women of the same age will account for 9.6% of all women.
! The “baby boom” generation will have accelerated population aging,
but aging will continue to be one of the most important defining
characteristics of the population, even after the youngest of the
“baby boom” population has passed away.  This reflects projections
of continuing low fertility coupled with improving survival in the
United States48
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Figure 4. Age-Sex Structure of the United States in Selected
Years
Source: CRS extractions from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB),
[http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html].
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Race and Ethnicity — The United States Is Becoming More
Diverse
The U.S. population is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse.  This
reflects two forces.  First, immigration has been a major influence on both the size
and the age structure of the U.S. population.  Although most immigrants tend to be
in their young adult ages, when people are most likely and willing to assume the risks
of moving to a new country, U.S. immigration policy has also favored the entry of
parents and other family members of these young immigrants.49  Second, major racial
and ethnic groups are aging at different rates, depending upon fertility, mortality, and
immigration within these groups.
Federal standards for collecting and presenting data on race and Hispanic origin
were established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1997.50  Race
and Hispanic origin are considered to be two separate and distinct concepts and are
considered separately in this report.
Race.  The OMB standards require federal agencies to use a minimum of five
race categories in their data collection and presentation efforts.  The new standards
were required to be used by the Census Bureau for the 2000 decennial census and by
other federal programs “as soon as possible, but not later than January 1, 2003.”51
! White refers to people having origins in any of the original peoples
of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa, 
! Black or African American refers to people having origins in any of
the Black racial groups of Africa.  
! American Indian and Alaska Native refers to people having origins
in any of the original peoples of North and South America (including
Central America), and who maintain tribal affiliation or community
attachment. 
! Asian refers to people having origins in any of the original peoples
of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent.  
! Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander refers to people having
origins in the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other
Pacific Islands.
For respondents unable to identify with any of these five race categories, the
OMB approved including a sixth category — “some other race.”
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Going beyond the minimum standards set by OMB, the census 2000 question
on race included 15 separate response categories and three areas where respondents
could write in a more specific group.52  Individuals were instructed to mark “one or
more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.”53 The
response categories and write-in answers were combined by the Census Bureau to
create the five minimum OMB race categories, as seen in Table 4.  Based on data
from the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the overwhelming majority of the
U.S. population — almost 99% — reported only one race.  The most prevalent group,
accounting for about 81% of the U.S. population, was those who reported that they
are white alone, followed by those who are Black or African American alone (with
almost 13% of respondents).  The smallest race group was the Native Hawaiian and
other Pacific Islander alone population, with 463,000 members, representing less than
0.2% of the U.S. population.
Table 4. U.S. Population, by Race: 2000





One race 277,524 98.62
White 228,104 81.05
Black or African American 35,704 12.69
Asian 10,589 3.76
American Indian and Alaska
Native 2,664 0.95
Native Hawaiian and other
Pacific Islander 463 0.16
Two races 3,578 1.27
Three races 289 0.10
Four or more races 31 0.02
Sources: CRS compilation based on : (1) U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1, Matrices
P7 & P9, Race Alone or in Combination: 2000, based on Census Summary File 1 (SF 1), 100% data.
[http://factfinder.census.gov/], (2) Census Bureau, Modified Race Data Summary File, Technical
Documentation, Issued Sept., 2002, at [http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/files/MRSF-01-
US1.html].
Notes: These figures update/modify those presented in E.M. Crieco and R.C. Cassidy, Overview of
Race and Hispanic Origin, U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000 Brief, C2KBR/01-1, issued Mar. 2001.
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Referring to Table 5, while about 81% of the population was white in 2000, that
figure is projected to fall to 72% by year 2050.54  Increases will be most dramatic for
Asians and for persons in the “other races” category (which includes American
Indians and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, and
individuals who identify with two or more races).  Between 2000 and 2050, the
number of Asians is expected to increase by 22.7 million, an increase of 213%, while
the number in the “all other races” (which includes persons who identify with two or
more races) category will increase by 15.3 million, or 217%.
Table 5. Projected U.S. Population, by Race: 2000 to 2050



































































Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin,”
Internet release data: Mar. 18, 2004, at [http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/].
Notes:  In thousands, except as indicated.  As of July 1. Resident population.  1/ “All other races”
includes American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone,
and Two or More Races.
Hispanic Origin.  OMB defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban,
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin
regardless of race.  Federal agencies are required to use a minimum of two
ethnicities:  “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino” in data collection and
presentation.  The new standard was used by the Bureau of the Census in the 2000
decennial census; other federal programs were expected to adopt the standards no
later than January, 1, 2003.
In census 2000, respondents of all races were asked  if they were Spanish,
Hispanic, or Latino, and were given the opportunity to differentiate between: (a)
Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano; (b) Puerto Rican; (c) Cuban; and (d) other
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Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.55  Based on this definition, almost 36 million persons, or
about 12.6% of the U.S. population, identified themselves as Hispanic.  The
remaining 246 million people, or 87.4%, were not Hispanic.56
As mentioned earlier, OMB and the U.S. Bureau of the Census consider race
and Hispanic origin to be distinct concepts.  The results from census 2000, however,
suggest that such a distinction is not made by persons  of Hispanic origin themselves.
The most commonly reported race for Hispanics was white alone — almost 17
million persons or almost 48% of the Hispanic population.  But, a staggering 14.9
million Hispanics — or 42.2% — reported that they belonged to “some other race,”
indicating that they did not identify with any of the 14 other categories offered on the
census questionnaire.57
Table 6 presents modified estimates of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic
populations of the United States.  The modification reconciles the census 2000 race
categories with those race categories that appear in the data from administrative
records, which are used to produce population estimates and projections.58  These are
also consistent with the recommended set of five categories by OMB.
Table 6. The Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Population
 in the United States, by Race: 2000
Race

















Total 35,306 100.00 12.55 246,116 100.00 87.45
One race 34,814 98.61 12.37 242,710 98.62 86.24
White 32,529 92.13 11.56 195,576 79.46 69.50
Black 1,391 3.94 0.49 34,313 13.94 12.19
Asian 232 0.66 0.08 10,357 4.21 3.68
American
Indian 566 1.60 0.20 2,097 0.85 0.75
Hawaiian 95 0.27 0.03 367 0.15 0.13
Two races 434 1.23 0.15 3,144 1.28 1.12
Three or more races 57 0.16 0.02 262 0.11 0.09
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Modified Race Data Summary File.
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Figure 5.  Hispanics and Non-Hispanics as Percentage 
of U.S. Population: 2000-2050 
The population of Hispanic or Latino origin is projected to steadily increase as
a percentage of the total U.S. population through 2050, rising from 12.6% in 2000 to
24.4% in 2050 (see Figure 5).
Source: CRS extractions from: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race,
and Hispanic Origin, at [http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/], internet release date: Mar.
18, 2004.
Some Policy Considerations
The changing demographic profile will impact upon a wide range of social and
economic issues in the United States.  The following section presents a short
discussion of some major policy considerations that are related to these changes.
Neither the list nor the discussions are comprehensive.
Work, Retirement, and Pensions.  The increasing financial pressure faced
by public pension systems, such as Social Security, is often attributed to demographic
trends that have led to aging populations.  However, beyond the simple  mathematics
of the worsening age dependency ratio,59 decreasing labor force participation rates
have contributed to financial imbalances within pension programs, further increasing
the number of retired persons relative to those in the workforce.
The declining labor force participation of older men is one of the most dramatic
economic trends of the past four decades in the United States.  Between 1963 and
CRS-23
60 Federal Forum on Aging-related Statistics, 2004, Older Americans 2004: Key Indicators
of Well-Being. Indicator #11, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Population Survey. 
61 For a more in-depth discussion, see CRS Report RL30629, Older Workers: Employment
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2003, labor force participation rates declined from 90% to 75% among men aged 55-
61.  Over this period, labor force participation rates dropped from 76% to 50% for
men aged 62-64 and from 21% to 12% for men aged 70 and over.60  For all of these
groups, most of the declines occurred prior to 1980.61
An individual’s decision of whether to stay in the workforce or to retire is based
on the complex interaction of a number of factors including, but not limited to:
! Eligibility for Social Security benefits, 
! Availability of and benefits under an employer-financed pension plan,
! Work incentives to stay in the labor force (such as continued benefit
accrual after attaining the early retirement age, options for phased
retirement or to work reduced hours, etc.), 
! The physical and cognitive health of the worker and potentially other
family members (spouse, an aging parent, an adult child with a
disability),
! Availability (and eligibility for) disability and unemployment
insurance programs, and, 
! The worker’s relative preference for “leisure” compared to
employment. 
Policy levers are, however, available to influence labor force participation and
retirement decision-making.  For instance, the federal government influences
employers’ decisions about whether to offer benefits like pensions and health
insurance through direct legislation, such as ERISA and the Age Discrimination Act;
through social insurance programs, such as Social Security and Medicare; and through
the financial incentives created for both employers and employees by the Internal
Revenue Code.62
Private Wealth and Income Security.63  Income security during retirement,
coupled with an increase in the number of post-retirement years during which
individuals can enjoy family and leisure, is one of the primary social achievements of
the 20th century.  At the same time, this accomplishment has introduced some
fundamental public policy challenges associated with population aging.  From an
individual’s perspective, the two most basic challenges are to ensure that they have
sufficient income security during their retirement years and that they have protection
against the increasing risk of experiencing periods of poor health and/or disability.
For policy-makers, there are fundamental questions with respect to what the
federal role should be in helping individuals meet these objectives.  A major domestic
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political challenge of the 21st century will be how to adapt our old-age income security
and health insurance systems to ensure financial solvency while ensuring that there is
an adequate safety net to protect the most vulnerable in the population.  One option
that is likely to be considered involves relying on individual private savings and
wealth accumulation to offset any reductions that may take place in the level of
public-tier support.  The underlying question is how realistic it is to assume that
individuals will save sufficiently over their lifetime to contribute significantly to their
own income needs during retirement.  Another central question regarding income
security for older persons is whether individuals and families will assume greater
responsibility for their own retirement if current government programs are scaled back
because of budgetary pressures.
The Federal Budget and Intergenerational Equity.  Several decades of
population aging have occurred in the United States wherein the proportion of young
persons has declined while the number of older persons has expanded dramatically.
The changing age structure has raised philosophical questions around the theme of
inter-generational equity.  Many analysts might expect such demographic changes to
have favorable consequences for children and troubling ones for older persons.  Fewer
children should mean less competition for resources in the home as well as greater
availability of social services earmarked for children, especially public schooling.  The
sharp rise in the number of elderly should put enormous pressure on resources directed
towards the older ages, such as medical care facilities, nursing homes, and social
security funds.64  However, Preston, in his 1984 presidential address to the membership
of the Population Association of America documented that exactly the opposite had
occurred: conditions for children had, in fact, deteriorated and improved dramatically
for older Americans.
 
Now, two decades later, the issue continues to be one of considerable debate.  A
recent study65 argued that, without an overhaul of entitlement programs (which largely
favor older persons) or tax-revenue reform, the ever-expanding Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid budgets will tighten the squeeze on other domestic spending
(including programs for children, welfare, education, the environment, community
development, housing, energy, and justice — programs that reach the majority of all
Americans.)  But, others argue that there are potentially catastrophic outcomes
associated with the redistribution of federal resources among age categories.  For
instance, the safety nets for the most vulnerable may be interrupted.  Costs might be
transferred to the states, with limited capacity to absorb the additional expenditures.
Individuals may be unable to assume the additional responsibilities asked of them.
There is no generally accepted rule in welfare economics for how an age group’s
interests ought to be represented in public decision-making.  As noted by Preston,66
however, we are continually faced with two questions.  First, do we care about our
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collective future — the commonwealth — or only about our individual futures?  And,
if we have collective concerns, we face an even more difficult decision about what mix
of private and public responsibilities will best serve the needs of the generations.  
The Health of an Aging Population.  Health is a critical policy variable.
Although population aging may or may not result in increasing proportions of older
persons in poor health, the numbers experiencing that condition are almost certain to
rise.  Thus, as the U.S. population ages, the social and economic demands on
individuals, families, communities, and the government will grow, with a substantial
impact on the formal and informal health and social care systems and on the financing
of medical services in general.
In conjunction with the growing numbers of older persons, the United States faces
secular change in health status, as reflected in rates and outcomes of various conditions
and disabilities.  Trends in cognitive impairment and dementia have enormous policy
implications, but whether changes in disease and disability rates will alter the rates of
long-term institutionalization is unclear.
While recognizing the necessity to address the changing health needs of the older
population, critical questions remain regarding the best mechanisms for health  system
organization, delivery of and access to services, administration, and financing.
Socioeconomic differentials also need to be addressed.
Immigration Policy.  Immigration has historically been a major contributor to
population growth in the United States, and immigration reform has recently been an
active topic for both the President and for Congress.  When President George W. Bush
announced his principles for immigration reform in January 2004, he included an
increase in permanent immigration as a key component.  President Bush has stated that
immigration reform is a top priority of his second term and has prompted a lively
debate on the issue.  Bills to revise permanent admissions are being introduced, but
only one has had any legislative action so far in the 109th Congress.  A provision in P.L.
109-13 (H.R. 1268, the emergency FY2005 supplemental appropriation) makes
available up to 50,000 employment-based visas for foreign nationals coming to work
as medical professionals.67
Security concerns are figuring prominently in the development of and debate on
immigration legislation in the 109th Congress.68  In May 2005, the REAL ID Act
became law as Division B of P.L. 109-13.  It contains a number of immigration and
identification document-related provisions intended to improve homeland security.
Among these are provisions to change the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) with
respect to asylum and other forms of relief from removal, to expand the terrorism-
related grounds for alien inadmissability and deportation, and to set standards for state-
issued drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards.
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The security-related issue of immigration enforcement remains on Congress’s
agenda.  Other immigration bills receiving action thus far in the 109th are measures on
alien victims of domestic violence, trafficking in persons, and refugees.69  
 
 The 108th Congress had also considered legislation on a wide range of
immigration issues.  Chief among these were the immigration-related recommendations
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known
as the 9/11 Commission), expedited naturalization through military service, and foreign
temporary workers and business personnel.70
America’s Changing Color Lines.  The U.S. population is becoming more
racially and ethnically diverse.  Once a mainly biracial society with a large white
majority and relatively small black minority — and an impenetrable color line dividing
these groups — the United States is now a society composed of multiple racial and
ethnic groups.  Along with increased immigration are rises in the rates of racial/ethnic
intermarriage, which in turn have led to a sizeable and growing multiracial
population.71  These trends are projected to continue for the next decades. 
 
This diversity presents policy challenges in a number of areas.  For instance:
! Assimilation.  Many Asian Americans  speak their native languages at
home and maintain their distinct ethnic cultures and values, signaling
that they either face difficulties fully assimilating into the American
mainstream or purposefully resist full assimilation.72 The continued
flows of Latino immigrants ensure that the Spanish language and
diverse Latino cultures will endure in the United States.73  The degree
to which there are language barriers or lack of assimilation of
immigrants has important implications for both entry into and
achievement in the educational system and the labor force.
! Income Disparities.  There are persistent differences in family incomes
among racial/ethnic groups in the United States.  For instance, in 2000,
the median income level for a black family — at about $31,000 — was
about $17,000 lower than that of a white family (about $52,000).74
One consequence of this disparity is that low-income/low-wealth
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persons face hurdles when attempting to become homeowners.75
Mortgage underwriting criteria present two potential borrowing
constraints for low-income buyers: (1) the wealth constraint results
from the buyers’ need to amass down-payment capital and funds to
cover other up-front costs necessary to initiate the transaction, and (2)
the income constraint results from maximum allowable total debt-to-
income and/or housing debt-to-income ratios employed in mortgage
underwriting.76
! Poverty.77  Impressive improvements were made in reducing poverty
rates between 1990 and 2000.  The poverty rate declined from 28.1%
to 21.2% among Hispanics, and from 12.2% to 10.8% among Asians
and Pacific Islanders.  The declines have been especially steep among
African Americans, with rates dropping from 31.9% to 22.1%.  Still,
America’s racial minorities continue to have disproportionately high
poverty rates. In 2000, 47% of the poor were non-Hispanic white, and
poverty rates among blacks and Hispanics were roughly twice the
national average.78  Poverty and welfare receipt are inextricably linked.
Government programs may help low-income persons meet their basic
daily needs (through cash assistance programs such as TANF79 or food
stamps).  But there is continuing fear that welfare creates economic
dependency and perpetuates the cycle of poverty.
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Appendix Table A.  U.S. Population Growth Rates, Birth Rates,
Death Rates, and Net Immigration Rates: 1950-2050
(per 1,000 population)
Year Growth Rate Birth Rate Death Rate Net Immigration Rate
1950 16.5 24.1 9.6 2.0
1960 16.0 23.7 9.5 1.8
1970 11.0 18.4 9.5 2.1
1980 10.8 15.9 8.8 3.7
1990 10.3 16.7 8.6 2.2
2000 8.9 14.4 8.5 3.2
2010 8.1 14.3 8.6 2.4
2020 7.8 14.2 8.7 2.3
2030 7.6 13.9 9.3 3.0
2040 6.9 14.0 9.8 2.7
2050 6.7 14.0 9.8 2.5
Sources:  Estimates (Years 1950-2000): Birth Rates: For years 1950, 1960, 1970: Vital Statistics of the
United States, 1999, vol. 1, Natality, Table 1-1, at website [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/stataib/
unpubd/natality/nata99.htm].  For years 1980, 1990, 2000: National Vital Statistics Report:  Births: Final
Data for 2002, 52(10): Table 1.
Death Rates: National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR): Deaths: Final Data for 2002, 53(5): Table 1. 
Net Immigration Rates:  For year 1950: U.S. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1980. Table 4.  For years 1960, 1970, and 1980: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990. Table
14, for year 1990, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, Table 4, at [http://www.census.gov/
statab/www/].  Note that Statistical Abstracts for selected years (back to 1878) are available at this site.
Growth Rates: CRS computations based on data on birth, death, and net immigration rates above. 
Projections (Years 2010-2050):  U.S. Census Bureau, Components of Change for the Total Resident
Population, Middle Series, 1999-2100, at [http://www.census.gov/population/www.projections].
Notes: Data on 1980 births are based on 100% of births in selected states and on a 50% sample in all
other states.
